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by who want to gain it by adopting the single surname. It was mentioned 
that the current surname system prevents people who are unwilling to 
change his/her surname marrying. Denial of the sense of unity which the 
latter person wants to realize by legal marriage cannot be justified. In 
addition, the reasonability of legislation to exclude any exception was not 
pursued in this case. Despite the fact that the Court assumed the 
disadvantage from changing a surname could be eased by using a by-
name, use of a by-name has no legal foundation, and thus provides no legal 
certainly. Usability of a by name does not grant reasonability to the 
legislature still avoiding any exception to the system. Moveover, 
international marriage does not lead to adopting a surname, since the 
family register only handles Japanese nationals. The current attitude 
shown by the Court to persist the family norms peculiar to Japanese 
nationals seems to be highly exclusive. This case revealed the Court’s 
attitude to hesitate to mend the family norms which are based on legal 
marriage and the legitimacy of the child, and the approach from the 
respect of the individual in a family unit shown in case 2014 was retreated. 
Though there is no clear statement of why the court should have avoided 
intervening in the traditional family norms, a risk of a persisting 
“normative” family structure, which could entrap people out of this 
structure as deviant and blindly bury individuals into the collectivity of a 
family, must be recognized.
4.?Law of Civil Procedure and Bankruptcy
X v. Y
Supreme Court 1st P.B., November 30, 2015
Case No. ?ju? No.2146 of 2014
69 ?7? MINSHU 392
Summary:
 In a case where the first instance makes a judgment that a litigation 
had been closed upon the Settlement having been reached and only the 
defendant filed an appeal against the judgment, while the plaintiff filed 
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neither an appeal nor an incidental appeal, if the court of second instance 
holds that the settlement in the litigation is invalid and that there are 
grounds for part of the plaintiff's claims, the court ?1? cannot render a 
judgment on the merits to revoke the judgment in the first instance and 
partially uphold the plaintiff's claim, because of the principle of prohibition 
of modifying the judgment in a prior instance in a manner disadvantageous 
to the appealing party, so ?2? has no choice but to dismiss the defendant’s 
appeal as a whole.
 
Reference:
 Code of Civil Procedure Arts. 267, 302, 304, 305.
 
Facts:
 X filed an action against Y, seeking surrender of a rented room 
?hereinafter referred to as the “Rented Room”? and payment of damages in 
an amount equivalent to the rent, based on ownership for the Rented 
Room.
 On May 8, 2013, X and Y reached a settlement in litigation ?hereinafter 
referred to as the “Settlement”?. Under this Settlement, Y shall vacate the 
Rented Room in exchange for receiving 2,200,000 yen from X. However, on 
May 22, 2013, Y filed a petition for the court to designate a date to continue 
the litigation that had already been closed, alleging the invalidity of the 
Settlement.
 The court of first instance found the Settlement valid and rendered a 
final judgment to the effect that this litigation had been closed upon the 
Settlement having been reached.
 Only Y filed an appeal against this judgment, while X filed neither an 
appeal nor an incidental appeal.
 The court of second instance found the Settlement valid end 
determined that the Settlement is invalid and that there are grounds for 
part of X's claim, and rendered a judgment to revoke the judgment in the 
first instance, declare the invalidity of the Settlement, and order Y to 
vacate the Rented Room in exchange for receiving 400,000 yen from X and 
pay damages in an amount equivalent to the rent, while dismissing the 
remaining part of X's claim.
 Y filed a petition for acceptance of final appeal, alleging that ?1? the 
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court of second instance determined that the Settlement is invalid, but 
neither party seeks a declaration of the invalidity of the Settlement, and 
therefore, the court of second instance is illegal for adjudicating a matter 
that has not been claimed by the parties; ?2? only Y filed an appeal against 
the judgment in the first instance, but the judgment of the second instance 
is more disadvantageous to Y, therefore, the second instance violates the 
principle of prohibition of modifying the judgment in a prior instance in a 
manner disadvantageous to the appealing party.
 
Opinion:
 Quashed and Decided by the Supreme Court ?the Appeal Dismissed?.
 “?1? A person who alleges the invalidity of a settlement in litigation is 
considered to be able to file an action to seek a declaration of the invalidity 
of the settlement. However, according to the case records, in this case, 
neither party seeks a declaration of the invalidity of the Settlement. 
Nevertheless, the court of prior instance rendered a judgment to declare 
the invalidity of the Settlement in the main text, and in this respect, the 
judgment in the prior instance is illegal for adjudicating a matter that has 
not been claimed by the parties, and such illegality apparently affects the 
judgment.
 ?2? Furthermore, a final judgment declaring that the litigation has 
been closed upon a settlement in l i t igation having been reached 
?hereinafter referred to as a "judgment declaring the close of the litigation 
by a settlement"? is a procedural judgment that finally determines, with 
the force of res judicata, only the fact that the litigation has been closed. 
Therefore, compared with this, a judgment on the merits that partially 
u p h o l d s t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m i s i n a f o r m d e e m e d t o b e m o r e 
disadvantageous to the defendant, regardless of the content of the 
settlement. Consequently, in a case where the court of first instance 
rendered a judgment declaring the close of the litigation by a settlement, 
and only the defendant filed an appeal and the plaintiff filed neither an 
appeal nor an incidental appeal, if the court of second instance renders a 
judgment on the merits to revoke the judgment in the first instance and 
partially upholds the plaintiff's claim, this would be in violation of the 
principle of prohibition of modifying the judgment in a prior instance in a 
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manner disadvantageous to the appealing party, and therefore the court of 
second instance should not be permitted to render such a judgment.
 It is inappropriate for the court of second instance to dismiss only 
partially an appeal that has been filed against a judgment declaring the 
close of the litigation by a settlement, because this would lead to making 
the close of the litigation effective for only part of the claim subject to the 
settlement, although it should have become effective for the claim as a 
whole. Therefore, in the abovementioned case, if the court of second 
instance holds that the settlement in litigation is invalid and that there are 
grounds for part of the plaintiff's claims and therefore intends to render its 
own judgment without remanding the case to the court of first instance, it 
would have no choice but to dismiss the defendant's appeal as a whole.
 This reasoning can be applied in this case as follows. Only Y, who is the 
defendant in the first instance, filed an appeal against the judgment in the 
first instance, which is a judgment declaring the close of the litigation by a 
settlement. Accordingly, if the court of a prior instance revokes the 
judgment in the first instance and partially upholds the claim of X, who is 
the plaintiff in the first instance, this would be in violation of the principle 
of prohibition of modifying the judgment in a prior instance in a manner 
disadvantageous to the appealing party, and therefore the court of prior 
instance should not be permitted to render such a judgment. Rather, even 
if the court of prior instance found that the Settlement is invalid and that 
there are grounds for part of X's claim, it would have no choice but to 
dismiss Y's claim as a whole, as long as it renders its own judgment 
without remanding the case to the court of first instance. Nevertheless, the 
court of a prior instance rendered a judgment to revoke the judgment in 
the first instance and order Y to vacate the Rented Room in exchange for 
receiving 400,000 yen from X and pay damages in an amount equivalent to 
the rent to X, while dismissing the remaining part of X's claim. Such a 
handling of the case by the court of prior instance involves a violation of 
laws and regulations that apparently affects the judgment.”
Editorial Note:
 In this case, the court of first instance made a final judgment that this 
litigation had been closed upon the Settlement is valid, and only Y filed an 
appeal, but the court of second instance determines the Settlement is 
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invalid and made a judgment on the merits because there is no need for 
additional oral arguments ?see Code of Civil Procedure Art. 307 ?1??. 
However, the Supreme Court said that ?1? the court of second instance is 
illegal for adjudicating a matter that has not been claimed by the parties; 
?2? the second instance violates the principle of prohibition of modifying 
the judgment in a prior instance in a manner disadvantageous to the 
appealing party. Especially, it would be a problem that ? whether the 
judgment in the second instance violates the the principle of prohibition of 
modifying the judgment disadvantageously; ? what should the second 
instance do if the court revokes the judgment of the prior instance and 
makes a judgment by itself because there is no need for remanding the 
case to the prior instance.
1. Adjudication a Matter not Claimed by Parties
 First, this new judgment determines that judgment of the second 
instance is illegal because it adjudicate the validity of the Settlement not 
claimed by parties. Some might say it is appropriate to adjudicate the 
validity, because an appellant who files an appeal against a judgment 
declaring the close of the litigation by a settlement generally seeks a 
declaration of the invalidity of the settlement. However, according to the 
precedent ?see judgment of the Supreme Court 2nd P. B., January 21, 
1972, 105 SHUMIN 13?, a judgment declaring the close of the litigation by a 
settlement is a judgment that finally determines, with the force of res 
judicata, only the fact that the litigation has been closed. And the parties 
can file another action to seek a declaration of the invalidity of the 
settlement. Therefore, the court cannot make a judgment about the 
validity of the settlement without a party’s petition.
2.? Is the judgment of the second instance more disadvantageous 
to Y ?
 In this case, the first instance only declares the close of the litigation, 
so there is a room to examine whether the judgment of the second 
instance is more disadvantageous to Y.
 There might be some arguments about the the principle of prohibition 
of modifying the judgment disadvantageously in relation to the judgment 
declaring the close of the litigation: ?comparing a determination of a 
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second instance with the res judicata of the judgment declaring the close 
of the litigation ; ? comparing a determination of a second instance with 
the res judicata of the settlement in litigation. And there might be a view 
that ? it is no problem to make a judgment on the merits because the 
judgment declaring the close of the litigation does not contain a decision 
on the merits ?see Case Comment, 1421 HANREI TAIMUZU 101, 102 ?2016??. 
It seems that the second instance in this case stands ?, but the Supreme 
Court stands ?.
 About an appeal against the judgment declaring the close of the 
litigation, there are few academic arguments, so this new judgment needs 
to be discussed academically.
3. What should the court of second instance do?
?1? Can the court of second instance make a judgment on the merits?
 If the judgment of the court of second instance in this case is illegal 
because of a violation of the principle of prohibition of modifying the 
judgment disadvantageously, what judgment should the court enter? At 
this point, the following discussion will be helpful: in the case only a 
plaintiff filed an appeal against dismissal, if the court of second instance 
determines that the claim is filed properly but the claim cannot be 
allowable, can the court dismiss the claim on the merits?
 According to the precedent ?see judgment of the Supreme Court 3rd P. 
B. , December 17 , 1985 , 39 ?8? MINSHU 1821?, because a d ismissal 
judgment on the merits is more disadvantageous than a dismissal 
judgment, the court can only dismiss the appeal ?cannot dismiss the 
claim?.
 However, this precedent of the Supreme Court is criticized by 
academics. Some says that the appellant normally wants the court to 
decide the merits through the appeal against the dismissal judgment. And 
another one says that making the dismissal judgment binding is improper 
from the viewpoint of judicial economics, because there is a high 
possibility that the plaintiff files the same action again.
 This new judgment stands on existing precedent and decides that the 
second instance shall dismiss the appeal when the determination of the 
second instance is disadvantageous to the appellant. Therefore, the above-
mentioned critical opinions will also criticize this new judgment. That is to 
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say, if the second instance dismisses the appeal in this case, the dispute 
between X and Y about the validity of the settlement is not concluded, and 
it is unavoidable that X or Y will file another action.
?2? Can the court of second instance dismiss the appeal partially?
 Although the second instance has no choice but to dismiss the appeal 
about the part that is not well-grounded, it seems possible for the court to 
uphold the appeal about the part that is well-grounded. However, the 
Supreme Court decided that the court of the second instance has no 
choice but to dismiss the appeal as a whole, because such a dismissal 
“would lead to making the close of the litigation effective for only part of 
the claim subject to the settlement, although it should have become 
effective for the claim as a whole”.
 Even a settlement in litigation may involve a person who is not a party 
in litigation or a matter that has no relation to the claim in the action. So, 
the validity of settlement has to be determined as a whole ?see Case 
C o m m e n t , 1421 HA N R E I TA I M U Z U 101 , 103 ?2016??. I f t h e a p p e a l i s 
dismissed partially, the judgment of the first instance about that part 
remains valid, but such a situation is inappropriate for one with the nature 
of a settlement; the wholeness of settlement. This point also has not been 
discussed well academically, so it needs to be examined.
4. The conclusion of this judgment 
 This new judgment decided that the court of second instance has no 
way but to dismiss the whole appeal , because of the principle of 
prohibition of modifying the judgment disadvantageously and the nature of 
settlement. However, as mentioned above, such a judgment cannot resolve 
the dispute, and X or Y will bring another action. Even if this new decision 
of the Supreme Court is proper in the light of theory, there is room to 
examine whether this decision is proper in the light of a case resolution.
5.?Commercial Law
X v. Seico Fresh Foods, K.K.
Supreme Court, March 26, 2015
